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Abstract 
During the economic expansion of the 1990s, the United States enjoyed both low 
inflation rates and low levels of unemployment.  Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) point 
out that the low unemployment rates for men in the 1990s were accompanied by 
historically high rates of non-employment suggesting that the 1990s economy was not as 
strong as the unemployment rate might indicate.  We include women in the analysis and 
examine whether the Phillips curve relationships between real compensation growth, 
changes in inflation, and labor market slackness are the same for men and women and 
whether measures of “non-employment” better capture underlying economic activity, as 
suggested by Juhn, Murphy, and Topel’s analysis.  From 1965 to 2002 the increase in 
women’s labor force participation more than offsets the decline for men, and low 
unemployment rates in the 1990s were accompanied by historically low overall non-
employment rates.  We find that women’s measures of labor market slackness do as well 
as men’s in explaining real compensation growth and changes in inflation after 1983. We 
also find some evidence that non-employment rates are more closely related to changes in 
inflation than other measures of labor market slackness; however, we do not find the 
same for real compensation growth.   2 
I. Introduction 
During the economic expansion of the 1990s, the United States enjoyed both low 
inflation rates and low levels of unemployment.  These facts have led some observers (for 
example, Stiglitz 1997 and Staiger, Stock and Watson 2001) to question whether the 
structure of the economy has changed, permanently lowering the natural rate of 
unemployment or the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). 
Against this backdrop, Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) examine men’s 
unemployment, labor force participation, and non-employment.  In the 1990s, the non-
employment rate (the fraction of weeks per year spent not working) was at a historic high 
compared to earlier periods of low unemployment.  They conclude that although the 
1990s saw very low unemployment rates for men, men shifting from unemployment to 
non-participation could, in part, explain these low rates.  Under these circumstances, they 
suggested that one need not rethink the NAIRU.  Instead, it may merely be that men were 
re-labeling their activity from unemployment to non-participation.  Thus, a given low 
unemployment rate in the 1990s did not necessarily represent the same high level of 
underlying economic activity as the same unemployment rate in earlier periods.  As such, 
declines in the unemployment rate in the 1990s did not put upward pressure on prices, 
leading to an extended period of both low unemployment rates and low inflation. 
The Juhn, Murphy, and Topel analysis explicitly focuses on men.  In this paper, 
we ask whether one would reach the same conclusion including women in the analysis, 
i.e., that the low unemployment rate in the 1990s did not represent as much underlying 
economic activity as similar unemployment rates in earlier time periods. Second, we 
directly examine whether the Phillips curve relationships between real compensation   3 
growth, changes in inflation, and labor market slackness are the same for men and 
women.  It may be the case that men’s unemployment rate, for example, puts a different 
amount of pressure on wages than women’s unemployment rate.  Additionally, we 
examine Juhn, Murphy, and Topel’s suggestion that measures of “non-employment” may 
better capture underlying economic activity, and thus may be more closely tied to real 
compensation growth and changes in inflation.   
Once women are included in the analysis, the 1990s again appear to be a period of 
robust economic activity, even when considering changes in labor force participation 
rates. Over the 1990s, women’s increased labor force participation more than offsets 
men’s decreased labor force participation.  Thus, low unemployment rates were 
accompanied by historically low rates of non-employment.  Although Phillips curve type 
analyses over the entire 1965-2002 period suggest that women’s measures of labor 
market slackness are less closely related to real wage growth and changes in inflation 
than men’s measures, these results mask stark differences over time.  Splitting the sample 
in two, we find that women’s measures of labor market slackness do as well as men’s in 
explaining real compensation growth and change in inflation after 1983.   
In section II of the paper we follow Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) in analyzing 
labor force status, but construct the measures using both men and women. Next, we 
present results from Phillips curve estimates using separate measure of labor market 
slackness for men and women, as well as allowing the relationships to change over time. 
In the final section we summarize and discuss our results. 
 
II.   Labor Force Status of Men and Women   4 
A.  Data 
Following Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002), we use the March Current Population 
Surveys (CPS) from 1979 to 2001 to examine changes in weeks worked over time.
1  In 
particular, we use survey questions about labor market status that refer to the previous 
year.  We exclude people who may not have worked because of school or military service 
and those living in group-quarters.  Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) also limit their 
sample to men with 1 to 30 years of potential experience.  Because we want to examine 
outcomes for women as well, and since potential experience may be a noisier measure of 
true labor market experience for women due to time out of the labor force for child-
rearing, we limit our sample based on reported age rather than potential experience.  
When we limit the sample to younger individuals (aged 18-55), the results for men are 
nearly identical to those for the Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) sample of men with 1 to 
30 years of potential experience.  In other cases, we examine individuals aged 18 and 
over.   
  Again following Juhn, Murphy, and Topel, we define the number of weeks of 
non-employment as 52 minus the number of weeks the individual reports working in the 
previous year.  This measure combines weeks unemployed and weeks out of the labor 
force.  The number of weeks of nonparticipation is defined as 52 minus the number of 
weeks worked last year and the number of weeks spent looking for work or on layoff. 
Weeks unemployed is defined as the number of weeks looking for work or on layoff.
2  
We examine the percent of the year spent unemployed, out of the labor force, or 
                                                        
1 We use the CPS data available through Unecon. 
2 In the CPS, weeks looking for work or on layoff applies to part-year workers.  There is a separate 
question about weeks looking for work for nonworkers.  Weeks not in the labor force is defined as 52   5 
nonemployed.  Here, percent of the year is just 100 times the number of weeks spent in a 
given state, divided by 52. 
 
B.  Results 
In Figure 1a we present data on the percent of the year spent in unemployment, 
out of the labor force (not participating), or non-employment for men aged 18-55 from 
1978 to 2000.  Despite the fact that we use age to define our sample and Juhn, Murphy 
and Topel (2002) use potential experience, Figure 1a reproduces the basic results shown 
in their Figure 3.  As expected, unemployment and non-employment rise during cyclical 
downturns and fall during booms.  As Juhn, Murphy and Topel (2002) note, however, 
nonparticipation among prime-aged men is rising over this period.  As a result, non-
employment remains relatively high during the 1990s, even as unemployment falls to the 
lowest levels in the period shown.  
  Juhn, Murphy and Topel make the point that the 1990s did not represent a 
particularly robust labor market for men, especially for low-skilled men.  They outline 
several potential reasons for this.  Changes in labor demand may have led to deterioration 
of the labor market for low-skilled men, consistent with rising wage inequality over this 
period.  In addition, changes in eligibility rules for disability insurance in 1984 may have 
allowed some men who were not previously eligible to withdraw from the labor market 
and collect disability insurance.  Autor and Duggan (2003) point out disability payments 
are calculated in such a way that rising wage inequality increases the relative value of 
disability payments for low skilled men.  This, in turn, may have increased the take-up 
                                                                                                                                                                     
minus weeks worked last year, minus the applicable variable for weeks spent looking for employment for 
part-year and non-workers.   6 
rate of disability benefits. Thus, from the demand side, firms may have wanted to hire 
fewer low-skilled men. From the supply side, disability insurance may have become 
relatively more attractive to low-skilled men with health challenges leading some of them 
to withdraw from the labor force. In either case, the low unemployment rates for men in 
the 1990s would to some extent represent a re-labeling of activity from unemployment to 
non-participation rather than a change in economic activity.  
Katz and Krueger (1999) make a related point about increasing incarceration rates 
over this period.  The Current Population Surveys only canvas the non-institutionalized 
population.  If incarceration is increasing, particularly among people who would likely 
have high unemployment rates, then it may not be surprising that measured 
unemployment rates among the non-institutionalized population declined over this 
period. Similarly, we show below that over the period we study, low-skilled men are 
decreasing their labor force participation, while higher-skilled women are increasing 
theirs.  In all of these cases, the low-skilled, who may have higher frictional rates of 
unemployment due to search costs or matching problems, are removed from the labor 
force.  If this trend characterizes the 1990s, then it is perhaps not surprising that the 
economy could sustain low rates of unemployment without rising inflation.  
   One of the reasons we care about whether the low unemployment rate in the 
1990s really represents a robust labor market is because of the importance of the 
relationships between unemployment, wages, and inflation for policy decisions. But 
typically, policy makers do not look at the unemployment rate for a just single group, 
such as prime-aged men. Thus, it is worth asking what unemployment, nonparticipation,   7 
and non-employment looked like for women and for the adult population overall during 
this period. 
    Figure 1b repeats the exercise above for women aged 18 to 55.  The bottom line 
shows the percent of the year spent in unemployment.  As for men during this period, 
unemployment is at its lowest level in the late 1990s.  Unlike the measures for men, 
however, the percent of the year spent out of the labor force and the percent of the year 
spent in non-employment both decline throughout the period.   
  Figure 2 shows these measures for the entire adult population, aged 18 and over.  
Again, we clearly see that the percent of the year spent in unemployment is at its lowest 
levels during the late 1990s. Taking men and women of all ages together, the increase in 
women’s labor force participation more than offsets the decline in men’s labor force 
participation, resulting in an overall decline in nonparticipation over the period. As a 
result, the overall non-employment measure reaches historically low levels in the 1990s.  
This would again lead one to question why the 1990s saw such robust labor market 
activity coupled with little upward pressure on prices. 
  One might hypothesize that women and older people put less pressure on wage 
growth than prime-aged males because on average they tend to work fewer hours in a 
given week of employment.  Thus, a given number of weeks worked represents different 
amounts of underlying labor market activity for different groups.  In order to consider the 
differences in usual hours worked per week, we create a full-time-equivalent (FTE) 
measure of non-employment.  Here, we weight the number of weeks worked by the 
number of hours typically worked in a given week, divided by 40.  The FTE percent of 
year in non-employment tracks our original measure of percent of year in non-  8 
employment quite closely. Toward the beginning of the period, FTE non-employment is 
somewhat higher than regular non-employment. By the end of the period, their relative 
positions are reversed. Using the FTE measure of percent of year in non-employment, 
one would still conclude that there has been a decline in the percent of year in non-
employment over the 1990s.  
These overall measures of labor market activity lead us to believe that the labor 
market of the 1990s was quite robust. Thus, one might again ask why there was not more 
upward pressure on prices.  However, men and women’s labor market activity measures 
may have fundamentally different relationships with wage and price changes if women 
and men put different pressures on wages, either because they work in different 
occupations, or because their wages are set by different processes.  We examine this 
question in the next section. 
 
III.  Phillips Curve Type Analyses 
 
A.  Macroeconometric Model 
Following Blanchard and Katz (1997), there are three simple equations, which 
macroeconometric models of the U.S. economy use to summarize the joint behavior of 
wage inflation, price inflation, and unemployment.  Changes in prices are related to 
changes in wages as in equation (1), where p and w are the natural logarithms of the price 
index and nominal wages, respectively. Similarly, changes in the logarithm of wages are 
related to the unemployment rate as in equation (2), where u is the unemployment rate. 
Here, α p and α w are constants, and ε pt and ε wt are error terms.    9 
(1)  pt t p t w p ε α + ∆ + = ∆  
(2)  wt t t w t u p w ε β α + + ∆ + = ∆ − 1  
Combining equations 1 and 2, we get the standard Phillips curve formulation. 
  (3)  t t t t u p p ε β α + + ∆ + = ∆ − 1  
In our estimation, we focus on versions of equations (2) and (3) and examine the 
effects of changes in measures of labor market slackness on real compensation growth 
and changes in inflation.  Specifically, we estimate: 
(2a)  wt t w t t u p w ε β α + + = ∆ − ∆ − 1  and 
(3a)  t t t t u p p ε β α + + = ∆ − ∆ − 1  
additionally allowing for lags of the dependent and right-hand-side variables in the 
estimation.  The exact lag structure is explained in detail below. 
 
B.  Data Section 
Following Aaronson and Sullivan (2000), we use both different measures of wage 
growth and different measures of labor market slackness in estimating the relationship 
between labor market status and compensation growth.     
We use two measures of compensation
3: Average Hourly Earnings from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics and Hourly 
Compensation from the BLS Productivity and Costs Report.  Average Hourly Earnings 
and Hourly Compensation are both available from 1964 through 2002.
4  Each of these 
compensation measures has somewhat different coverage.  Average Hourly Earnings is 
                                                        
3 Aaronson and Sullivan also consider compensation growth as measured by the Employer Cost Index 
(ECI). We do not consider the ECI here because it is not available before 1982.   10 
based on data from the Payroll Survey and is calculated for production and non-
supervisory employees on private non-farm payrolls (approximately 80% of total 
employment on private, non-farm payrolls).  Because Average Hourly Earnings is based 
on a survey of employers, it does not cover the self-employed or unpaid family workers.  
In addition, Average Hourly Earnings does not include benefits such as health insurance.  
However, it does include overtime pay.   
Hourly Compensation is also based on the Current Employment Statistics, so we 
would expect a certain amount of similarity between the two series.  However, the Hourly 
Compensation measure also incorporates data from other sources, giving it wider 
coverage than Average Hourly Earnings.  Hourly Compensation is calculated for the non-
farm business sector, and includes estimates of earnings for the self-employed and unpaid 
family labor.  Similar to Average Hourly Earnings, Hourly Compensation includes 
overtime compensation.  However it also includes benefits.  Additionally, whereas 
Average Hourly Earnings covers only the private sector, Hourly Compensation includes 
the public sector as well.   Finally, Average Hourly Earnings are reported on a monthly 
basis while Hourly Compensation is reported quarterly.  
We also estimate Phillips curve relationships represented by equation (3a) using 
change in inflation as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditure Chain-Type 
Price Index (PCE).  Throughout, all variables are averaged over the year to create annual 
data, and the compensation measures are inflation-adjusted using the lagged value of the 
PCE. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Hourly Compensation is available from 1947 to the present, but we only use data from 1964 on to match 
data availability for Average Hourly Earnings.   11 
  We consider three measures of labor market slackness: the civilian unemployment 
rate for those 16 years and older, the civilian unemployment rate for those 25-55 years of 
age, and the non-employment rate (one minus the civilian employment-to-population 
ratio, multiplied by 100) for persons 16 years and older. For each measure of labor 
market slackness we use the measure for the overall population, men, and women. For 
each combination of compensation growth or change in inflation and labor market 
slackness, we estimate Phillips curve relationships. 
The measures of labor market slackness used in this section are based on survey 
responses about activity in the previous week, unlike the measures in the previous 
section, which were based on weeks spent in various labor market activities during the 
previous year. Before turning to our Phillips curve type analyses, we verify that both 
measures of labor market status give us similar information about aggregate changes in 
men’s, women’s, and overall labor market activity. Figure 3a and 3b are comparable to 
Figures 1a and 1b, but use persons aged 16 and over. As in the earlier figures, we see that 
men’s non-participation is rising over the period, hitting a new high in the late 1990s. At 
the same time, women’s non-participation is falling fairly steadily. Figure 4 displays the 
statistics for men and women combined, including all years available for these measures. 
Vertical lines mark the 1978-2000 period used in the analysis above. Again, for the labor 
market as a whole, the unemployment rate is low, and non-employment and 
nonparticipation reach historical lows by the late 1990s.   12 
 
C.  Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for changes in inflation, real wage growth, 
and our measures of labor market slackness. We graph compensation growth and 
inflation in Figure 5, overall measures of labor market slackness in Figure 6a, 
unemployment measures in Figure 6b, and non-employment measures in Figures 7a and 
7b.  Many researchers speculate that there have been changes in these relationships over 
time, thus in we present summary statistics for two time periods: 1965-1983 and 1984-
2002. Below we describe the reasons for splitting the sample in this way in more detail.  
Figures 5, 6a, and 6b confirm well-known facts about the U.S. economy.  
Inflation and unemployment have both been lower in more recent years.  Real 
compensation growth has also been somewhat lower in the second half of the data, 
although growth rates were generally rising over the 1990s.
5  Unemployment is lower 
among prime-age individuals than among all individuals.  Looking at Figure 6b, women 
are more likely to be unemployed than men; however, since 1983 the levels of 
unemployment for men and women and prime-aged men and women are much closer 
together.  Finally, in Figure 7a we can see that women are more likely to be non-
employed than men, but over the entire period, women’s non-employment fell 
dramatically, while men’s rose slightly.  Because of the strong secular trend in men and 
women’s labor force participation, when we turn to estimating real compensation growth 
and changes in inflation, we detrend the measures of non-employment. See Figure 7b. 
                                                        
5 Note that Hourly Compensation has grown faster in both periods than has Average Hourly Earnings. This 
may be because Hourly Compensation includes benefits, and based on information from the Employer Cost 
Index the benefits component of compensation has been growing more quickly than the wage component in   13 
Each non-employment series is detrended by subtracting off its Hodrick-Prescott filter 
trend component.
6  
Table 2 presents the results of our Phillips curve type analyses over the entire 
1965-2002 period.  As mentioned above and discussed in more detail below, there are 
many reasons to believe that these relationships have changed over time; however, we 
present results from the overall period for completeness and turn to estimates by separate 
time periods in the next section.   
Columns 1 and 2 report results for our two measures of real compensation 
growth; column 3 presents results for the change in inflation. In each case, we include the 
optimal lag structure indicated by appropriate information criteria tests.
 7  Hourly 
Compensation growth estimates include one lag of the dependent variable and the 
contemporaneous measure for labor market slackness. The Average Hourly Earnings 
growth estimates include one lag of the dependent variable, the contemporaneous 
measure of labor market slackness, and, depending on the given measure, between one 
and four additional lags of the measure of labor market slackness.
8 The change-in-
inflation estimates include two lags of the dependent variable, and the contemporaneous 
measure of labor market slackness.  In all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
most years since the ECI began. However, the measures are also different in their coverage, so it is difficult 
to pin down the precise source of their difference.   
6 Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002) we set the smoothing parameter equal to 6 because we are using annual 
data. 
7 First we used Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion to choose the optimal number of lags of the 
dependent variable to include in each specification. Using the optimal dependent variable lag length as 
determined above, we then estimated a series of regressions allowing for current and 0 to 4 lags of each 
measure of labor market slackness and calculate the Bayesian Information Criterion (T*ln(RSS) + k*ln(T) 
where T is the number of observations, k is the number of parameters estimated, and RSS is the residual 
sum of squares) to choose the optimal lags of the measures of labor market slackness. 
8 Specifically, the BIC selects one lag of overall unemployment, 3 lags of men’s and women’s  
unemployment, 4 lags of prime age unemployment, 1 lag of men’s prime age unemployment, 3 lags of 
women’s prime age unemployment, and 1 lag of overall, men’s, and women’s detrended non-employment.     14 
no autocorrelation. That said, we use Newey-West standard error estimates allowing for 
up to fourth-order autocorrelation.  
Each group of results in the table summarizes one set of estimates. We report the 
adjusted R-squared, which allows us to assess which measure of labor market slackness 
explains the most variation in a given dependent variable.  The implied “zero growth” 
rate is analogous to the “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” or NAIRU.  In 
the first two columns, it is the rate of labor market slackness consistent with zero real 
wage growth.  In the third column, it is the rate of labor market slackness consistent with 
no change in the rate of inflation.
9  For detrended non-employment we have added back 
the average of the HP-filter trend component in order to consider the levels of non-
employment associated with zero compensation growth and no acceleration in inflation.  
Next, we report the p-value for the F-statistic on the joint significance of the measures of 
labor market slackness followed by the p-value for the chi-squared statistic for the null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation.
10 
  Consider the results for the overall unemployment rate in table 2.  The first row 
reveals a pattern that is consistent throughout the table.  The fraction of the variation in 
the dependent variable that is explained by the model is highest for real Average Hourly 
Earnings growth, next highest for real Hourly Compensation growth, and lowest for 
changes in inflation.  Despite the differences in their definitions and coverage, the two 
measures of real compensation growth yield similar estimates for the rate of 
unemployment that is consistent with no growth in real compensation.  The implied zero 
                                                        
9 This is calculated from the regression results as the negative of the constant divided by the sum of the 
coefficients on the relevant measures of labor market slackness (Staiger, Stock, and Watson 1997). 
10 This is calculated using “Durbin’s alternative test” because most estimates include a lagged dependent 
variable.   15 
growth rate of unemployment is 7.7 percent for real Hourly Compensation growth and 
6.7 percent for Average Hourly Earnings growth.   
  The implication of the Phillips curve econometric model is that lower 
unemployment increases inflation through wage growth, because in response to wage 
pressures, producers increase prices.  Thus, one would expect that accelerating inflation 
would require that the unemployment rate be low enough to create real wage growth. The 
implied levels of labor market slackness associated with zero growth in inflation are 
consistent with this idea.  In all cases, the estimate is below the implied level associated 
with zero growth in real compensation, meaning that unemployment has to be low 
enough to affect real compensation growth before it triggers inflation acceleration.
11  
  The main point of this analysis is to compare the explanatory power of different 
measures of labor market slackness for both the overall population and men and women 
separately.   First compare explanatory power across different overall measures of labor 
market slackness for real Hourly Compensation growth.  Looking down column 1 at the 
first set of entries for each measure, we see that the prime-age unemployment rate 
explains the most variation in real Hourly Compensation growth (58 percent), with the 
overall unemployment rate explaining the second largest percentage (52 percent), and 
non-employment explaining the least (38 percent).  This is also the case for the Average 
Hourly Earnings growth. These results suggest, perhaps not surprisingly, that what 
matters for compensation growth is the labor market tightness for those whom we think 
are most attached to the labor market.  For estimates of the change in inflation, the results 
                                                        
11 Alternatively, one could calculate the level of unemployment consistent with compensation growth equal 
to labor productivity growth.  Over the analysis period, productivity growth averages 1.96 percent per year.  
This raises the level of unemployment further above the level associated with no acceleration in inflation.  
The same is true for prime-age unemployment rates.   16 
are different in that the overall non-employment rate explains the most variation (48 
percent).  Prime age unemployment explains about 40 percent of the variation, and 
overall unemployment explains about 35 percent. 
These results provide no evidence that overall non-employment explains real 
compensation growth better than measures of overall unemployment.  However, this is 
not entirely consistent with what we might expect given the secular trends in labor force 
participation.  If, over time, people are more or less inclined to label themselves as out of 
the labor force rather than unemployed, the non-employment rate should be a more 
consistent measure of labor market activity. Thus, we would expect that non-employment 
might be more closely associated with changes in compensation growth than measures of 
unemployment.
12    Below, we evaluate whether this might be true for men more than 
women and whether these relationships are changing over time. 
  Next, consider differences in men’s and women’s measures of labor market 
slackness in explaining changes in wages and prices.  Recall that our analysis above 
shows that once women’s labor market participation is taken into consideration, the 
1990s again appear to be a period of remarkably robust labor market activity combined 
with low inflation.  Juhn, Murphy, and Topel’s interpretation that one need not rethink 
the 1990s implications for the natural rate of unemployment was based solely on the 
labor market outcomes for men.  Since women’s increased labor market participation 
more than offsets men’s decreased labor market participation, the question of why the 
United States was able to maintain such low unemployment and inflation during the 
                                                        
12 Additionally, we find the somewhat inconsistent result that the levels of non-employment associated with 
zero Hourly Compensation growth are below those associated with no acceleration in inflation. That said, 
levels of non-employment associated with compensation growth rates equal to average growth in labor 
productivity exceed those associated with no inflation acceleration.   17 
1990s is germane.  One possible explanation is that women’s labor market slackness puts 
a different amount of downward pressure on wages and prices than does men’s.  For 
example, a one percentage point decrease in men’s unemployment might have a different 
impact on wage growth than a one percentage point decrease in women’s unemployment.  
There are many different models of the labor market that could generate such differences.  
Consider, for example, a segmented labor market where men and women do not compete 
for the same jobs.  Alternatively, a model where men and women have very different 
reservation wages, perhaps because of differences in the value of their home production 
activities, could yield differences in the effect of men’s and women’s measures of labor 
market slackness on real compensation growth and changes in inflation.  Also, 
provocative new evidence suggests that women are less likely to bargain for higher 
wages than are men, perhaps suggesting that their labor market activities put less upward 
pressure on wages, and thus prices (See Babcock and Leschever (2003)).  An exhaustive 
assessment of the validity of these hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
worth keeping in mind that there are many potential reasons that measures of labor 
market slackness for men and women might have different macroeconomic implications.  
It is an empirical question whether or not this is the case. 
  We now turn to an assessment of whether men’s and women’s measures of labor 
market slackness differentially explain measures of real compensation growth and 
changes in inflation.  Looking down the R-squared statistics in the first column, men’s 
measures of labor market slackness explain a greater share of the variation in real Hourly 
Compensation growth than women’s measures of labor market slackness.   The 
specification using men’s overall unemployment rate explains about 58 percent of the   18 
variation in real Hourly Compensation growth while the specification using women’s 
overall unemployment rate only explains about 39 percent of the variation.  The 
comparisons between men’s and women’s measures are similar for the specifications 
using prime-age unemployment (although the adjusted R-squared increases more for 
women’s prime age unemployment than for men’s).  
Estimates for Average Hourly Earnings growth are somewhat different.  In the 
case of overall unemployment, the women’s measure explains only slightly less of the 
variation in the left-hand-side variable than the men’s.  For prime-age unemployment, the 
women’s measure does a bit better.  In fact, overall men’s unemployment explains more 
of the variation in real Average Hourly Earnings growth than men’s prime-age 
unemployment rate. Differences in coverage may account for some of the difference in 
the results for men and women between Average Hourly Earnings and Hourly 
Compensation.  For example, since women are less likely to be supervisors than men and 
Average Hourly Earnings covers only non-supervisory workers, changes in Average 
Hourly Earnings growth rates may more closely reflect changes in women’s 
compensation than the Hourly Compensation measure.   
Next, consider the models that include the detrended non-employment rate as the 
measure of labor market slackness.  Again, for both real Hourly Compensation growth 
and real Average Hourly Earnings growth, the men’s measure of labor market slackness 
has greater explanatory power than the women’s measure of labor market slackness. The 
men’s detrended non-employment rate explains 40 percent of the variation in the growth 
of real Hourly Compensation and 74 percent of the variation in the growth of real 
Average Hourly Earnings. Women’s detrended non-employment explains 34 percent of   19 
the variation in real Hourly Compensation growth and 64 percent of the variation in real 
Average Hourly Earnings growth. 
The results for changes in the inflation rate are similar to the previous results in 
showing that men’s measures of labor market slackness explain a larger share of the 
variation in the dependent variable than women’s measures of labor market slackness. 
What is particularly striking, however, is that the specification using men’s non-
employment rate explains more of the variation in changes in inflation (49 percent) than 
either the overall men’s unemployment rate or the men’s prime-age unemployment rate. 
In contrast, for the cases of real Hourly Compensation growth and real Average Hourly 
Earnings growth, corresponding measures of unemployment and prime-age 
unemployment explain more of the variation in the dependent variable than the non-
employment rates.   
  In sum, there is fairly consistent evidence that men’s measures of labor market 
slackness have more explanatory power in real compensation growth and changes in 
inflation than do women’s measures of labor market slackness. Of all the measures, 
men’s prime age unemployment explains the highest share of the variation in Hourly 
Compensation growth and men’s detrended non-employment explains the highest share 
of changes in inflation.  These results have several implications.  First, if women’s labor 
force activities are less relevant for changes in compensation and prices than are men’s, 
Juhn, Murphy, and Topel’s conclusions, which are based solely on men’s labor force 
activities, may be right.  In other words, the low unemployment and inflation that 
characterized the U.S. economy in the 1990s labor market need not lead one to question 
whether the natural rate has fallen.   Second, there is some support for Juhn, Murphy, and   20 
Topel’s implication that non-employment is a more relevant labor market statistic to 
consider than (self-defined) measures of unemployment -- at least when considering 
changes in inflation. That said, it is somewhat surprising that non-employment does not 
also explain the largest share of the variation in real compensation growth given the 
channel through which measures of labor market slackness are expected to affect 
inflation. 
 
Changes Over Time 
    The results above suggest that, in general, men’s measures of labor market 
slackness are more closely related to growth in real compensation and changes in 
inflation than women’s measures of labor market slackness.  However, we know that 
women’s labor market participation changed markedly over the years in our sample.  
Therefore, we now investigate whether the relationships between changes in inflation and 
real compensation growth and measures of men’s and women’s labor market slackness 
have changed as women’s labor market participation increased. In other words, as 
women’s labor market behavior was becoming more similar to men’s, did their measures 
of labor market slackness begin to look the same in macroeconometric models? 
    Before examining Phillips curve estimates over different time periods, we first 
consider changes in men and women’s labor force participation since 1964, in order to 
understand when one might expect to see a change in the effect of women’s measures of 
labor market slackness.  Figure 8a shows labor force participation rates by 5 education 
groups for men aged 25 years and over.  We focus here on those 25 years and older to 
capture participation decision among individuals who are more likely to have completed   21 
their formal education.  Figures 8b and 9 show analogous numbers for women and the 
overall population, respectively. 
  Labor force participation declined for all men between 1964 and 2002, but there 
were large differences by education group.
13  Declines were steepest for those with less 
than a high school diploma.  However, in the late 1990s, the decline in the participation 
rate among those men with only elementary education began to reverse, and by 2002, 
their participation rates were comparable to those of similarly educated men in 1979. For 
women, we see a very different picture.  Participation rates were fairly flat for women 
with less than a high school diploma.  For women with a high school diploma or more 
education, participation rates rose over this period.  Combining women and men, we see 
that labor force participation declined among the lowest education groups, was relatively 
flat for those with a high school diploma, and increased among those with some college 
or a college degree. Over the period, low-skilled men were replaced in the labor force by 
relatively high-skilled women.  As mentioned above, if higher skilled workers have lower 
frictional unemployment because they are easier to match to jobs or have lower search 
costs, this change could be another reason that the “natural” rate of unemployment 
appeared to be lower later in the period.  
If in the later time period, women’s labor force behavior is more similar to men’s, 
then their labor market slackness measures maybe more closely tied to measures of real 
compensation growth and changes in inflation.  Additionally, as women’s labor force 
participation increased, the civilian labor force became increasing female. In 1965, 35 
                                                        
13 The decline in men’s labor force participation does not simply represent changes in retirement behavior. 
For men 25 to 54 years of age, the labor force participation rate declined from an average of 97 percent in 
1964 to 91 percent in 2002. Over the same period, women’s labor force participation increased from 45 to 
76 percent. Authors’ calculations based on monthly participation rates by age and sex from the BLS.   22 
percent of the civilian labor force was comprised of women while by 2002, 47 percent of 
the labor force was female.
14 Mechanically, this means that women will also make up a 
larger share of the data on compensation. Thus, it might not be surprising to find closer 
relationships between women’s measures of labor market slackness and real 
compensation growth in later years. 
In figure 8b it appears that there is a change in women’s labor force participation 
trends in the mid- to late-1980s.  More highly educated women are increasing their labor 
force participation at a fairly steep rate until roughly the middle of the analysis period. In 
the latter part of the period, women’s labor force participation rates flatten out.  
Additionally, as shown in figure 6b, men’s and women’s unemployment rates are more 
similar since the mid-1980s.  From 1964 to 1983 women’s rates of unemployment were 
nearly 1.5 percentage points higher than men’s unemployment rates. Over the remainder 
of the period, women’s unemployment rates averaged 0.1 percentage points below and 
0.1 percentage points above men’s rates for overall and prime-age unemployment, 
respectively.   
In order to more formally establish a dividing year for our analysis, we tested for 
a structural break in women’s labor force participation, using a sup Wald test (Cooper, 
Braga, Kennedy, and Piehl 2003).
15  We find evidence of a structural break in 1984, and 
thus we separate our sample in to two periods, 1965-1983, and 1984-2002.  
                                                        
14 Based on authors’ calculations from aggregate CPS data available from the BLS. 
15 First, we tested and rejected that women’s labor force participation follows a random walk, using the 
Dickey-Fuller test.  Next, we formed the sup Wald test by running separate regressions allowing the “post” 
period to be defined as starting with a different year in each regression (with the restriction that there are 
always at least 5 percent of the observations in either the pre or post periods).  The largest F-statistic for the 
“post” dummy, measured against the appropriate critical values, indicates where the structural break 
occurs. Note that Monte Carlo simulations examining where this test would pick a structural break if 
women’s labor force participation followed a straight time trend, place the break earlier in the period.   See   23 
Serendipitously, 1984 is also when eligibility rules for disability insurance were changed, 
which many observers associate with the decline in low-skilled men’s labor force 
participation.
16  
Table 3 presents the results for the Phillips curve estimation with the sample split 
into two periods.  Period one covers the 18 years from 1965 to 1983. Period two covers 
the 19 years from 1984 to 2002.  For the estimates shown, we allow each specification to 
have a different lag structure, based on information criteria as described for the table 2 
analysis.  At the top of each column, we report which lags of the dependent variable are 
included in each specification. At the top of each group of reported results, we report the 
lags of the labor market slackness measure included in that estimation.  In all cases, the 
contemporaneous measure of labor market slackness is also included.    We have also run 
the regressions restricting the lag structure to be the same within each column.
17 The 
results are broadly similar. 
Using a full set of interactions, we test, and reject, that the coefficients are equal 
in the two periods for all cases but do not report the results in this table.
18  Instead, we 
report the p-value for the F-test of whether the coefficients on the labor market slackness 
variables are jointly equal across the time periods.  For real Hourly Compensation 
growth, we reject that the coefficients are equal on each of the overall measures of labor 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Cooper, et al. (2003) for more details.  For men, we could not reject a unit root in labor force participation, 
which invalidates the sup Wald test for them.  
16 Other researchers have also noted important changes in the economy before and after 1984. Atkeson and 
Ohanian (2001) state that the business cycle, monetary policy, and inflation all are less volatile since 1984 
than in the previous 15 years. 
17 In this case, we set the dependent variable lags equal to the maximum lag length selected by the BIC for 
that dependent variable in that particular time period. Similarly, we set the number of lags of the measure 
of labor market slackness equal to the maximum number of lags chosen for that labor market slackness type 
(unemployment, prime-age unemployment, or non-employment) within period.  The results are available 
from the authors on request. 
18 These results are available from the authors on request.   24 
market slackness. We can also reject joint equality for men’s overall and prime-age 
unemployment rates as well as the detrended non-employment rate of women.  Rejecting 
equality across the time periods for men’s measures of unemployment and failing to 
reject equality across the periods for men’s non-employment is concordant with the idea 
that non-employment is a consistent measure of men’s labor market activity while 
unemployment rates are subject to changes in whether men define themselves as 
unemployed or out of the labor force.  However, this pattern fails to hold up when 
looking at real Average Hourly Earnings growth or changes in inflation.  In contrast, we 
reject equality of coefficients across periods on all labor market slackness measures when 
we look at real Average Hourly Earnings growth.  For changes in the rate of inflation, we 
only reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients for women’s overall and prime-
age unemployment rates, failing to reject coefficient equality over time for all male 
measures of labor market slackness. 
The additional results reported for each specification are defined as in the 
previous table.  First consider estimates using Hourly Compensation growth.  In period 1, 
the specifications using men’s measures of labor market slackness explain more of the 
variation in the left-hand-side measure than do specifications that use women’s measures.  
In period 2, this has reversed for both overall unemployment and for non-employment 
rates.  For prime age unemployment the adjusted R-squareds are very close (0.536 for 
men’s prime age unemployment and 0.523 for women’s).  For Average Hourly Earnings 
growth, men’s and women’s unemployment rates explain about the same fraction of the 
variation in both period 1 and 2.  However, in the specifications that include detrended 
non-employment, the women’s measure does worse than the men’s in period 1 and the   25 
about the same as the men’s in period 2.  The estimates using changes in inflation as the 
dependent variables show a similar pattern.  Men’s measures of unemployment explain 
somewhat more of the variation in changes in inflation than do women’s in the earlier 
period.  In the second period, each of the women’s measures explains more variation than 
the men’s. 
  Table 3 also has interesting implications for whether men’s non-employment is a 
more consistent measure of labor market activity than unemployment measures. If this is 
the case, we would expect the men’s rate of non-employment to explain more of the 
variation in real compensation growth and changes in inflation than men’s measures of 
unemployment, particularly in the most recent period.  While in general this is not the 
case, we do see this pattern in the inflation specifications.  Indeed, in both periods, and 
for the overall, men’s, and women’s versions of the measures, detrended non-
employment explains more of the variation in changes in inflation than do other measures 
of labor market slackness.  Again, this result calls into question the precise mechanism 
through which real wage growth gets translated into changes in inflation.  However, it 
also suggests that Juhn, Murphy, and Topel’s insight that we should focus on non-
employment rather than simply unemployment rates is important for changes in inflation.   
In sum, the results in this section suggest that in the earlier period, women’s labor 
market activities were less closely related to real compensation growth and changes in 
inflation than were men’s.  However, in the second period, when women constitute a 
larger fraction of the labor force, their labor market activities are more closely tied to 
growth in real compensation and changes in inflation as measured by adjusted R-squared 
statistics and, in fact, often fit the data better than the men’s measures.  Thus, when trying   26 
to explain real compensation growth and changes in inflation, we conclude that one 
should use measures of labor market slackness that include both men and women. 
 Once again, then, the 1990s pose something of a puzzle.  The first section of the 
paper demonstrated that when we include women in the analysis, labor market slackness, 
whether measured by unemployment or by non-employment, was low in the 1990s, and 
yet, they were accompanied by low and stable rates of inflation. This again leads one to 
question whether the “natural rate” of labor market slackness changed over time.  We 
examine our data’s implications for the “natural rate of labor market slackness” in the 
next section.     
 
Implied Zero Growth Rates 
  Our analyses above allow us to calculate the rate of labor market slackness 
associated with no wage growth or no increase in inflationary pressure.  We can use these 
calculations to examine whether this “natural rate” has changed between the two time 
periods.  Here we focus on the measures of labor market slackness that include both men 
and women, and ask how the implied zero growth rates have changed over time. 
  In table 4 we present estimates of the levels of labor market slackness consistent 
with zero compensation growth and a constant inflation rate.  One might alternatively 
calculate the levels of labor market slackness consistent with compensation growth 
somewhat above zero because increases in labor productivity can allow for positive 
compensation growth without leading to increases inflation.  Thus, we also present 
estimates of the level of labor market slackness associated with compensation growth 
equal to average labor productivity growth in the period.  For the detrended non-  27 
employment rate specifications, we again add back the (within period) average of the HP-
filter trend component to the calculations in order to report a non-employment rate level 
associated with the compensation growth assumptions and constant inflation.  Standard 
errors for these estimates are calculated using the delta method with the Newey-West 
standard error estimates allowing for up to fourth-order autocorrelation. 
  In all but one case (prime age unemployment, Average Hourly Earnings growth, 
and average labor productivity growth), the level of labor market slackness in period 2 
that is associated with either zero compensation growth or compensation growth equal to 
average labor productivity growth is lower than the corresponding level in period 1.  
However, the change in the prime-age unemployment rate associated with real Average 
Hourly Earnings growth either equal to zero or equal to labor productivity growth is not 
statistically different from zero.
19  Likewise, the fall in the non-employment rate 
associated with real Hourly Compensation growth set equal to either assumption is not 
different from zero.  For no change in the rate of inflation, the level of labor market 
slackness fell in all cases and all changes are statistically different from zero.  In sum, the 
results largely show that significantly lower rates of labor market slackness are consistent 
with no wage or inflation pressure in the latter period.   
The table 4 results are consistent with the U.S. economy undergoing a change 
such that it can now sustain lower rates of labor market slackness without sparking wage 
and inflation pressure.  Whether this constitutes a “structural change” depends on one’s 
exact definition.  The change could come from changes on the demand side—increased 
productivity, changes in production practices, etc.—that allow the economy to absorb a 
                                                        
19 Testing the difference with the reported statistics and standard errors is not strictly correct given that the 
samples have some overlap in data; however, the importance of this distinction is likely to be small.   28 
greater amount of economic activity more easily.  However, these results are equally 
consistent with changes in the labor market, discussed above, such that in recent years 
low-skilled individuals have withdrawn from the labor force, and higher skilled 
individuals, who are thought to have lower frictional rates of unemployment, have taken 
their place.  In some sense, which of these two explanations is correct makes little 
difference for some policy decisions.  A policymaker asking whether currently measured 
rates of overall unemployment and non-employment are consistent with stable wages and 
prices could be told “yes” under either scenario.  However, whether policies that tried to 
absorb those who are currently out of the labor force into employment would be equally 
consistent with stable wages and prices depends critically on whether the new lower 
“natural rate” is due to demand side or supply side changes.      
 
D. Summary and Conclusions 
 Despite very low levels of unemployment in the 1990s, men’s non-employment 
remained high compared to earlier periods. This finding led Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 
(2002) to conclude that the 1990s did not represent a historically robust labor market for 
men, particularly for low-skilled men.  Thus, questions about whether the 1990s 
represented a new, lower “natural” rate of unemployment may have been misplaced.  
Here we show that once women are added to the analysis, this question appears to be 
relevant.  Women’s labor force participation increased dramatically during the period that 
men’s was falling.  Indeed, women’s labor force participation increased enough to 
compensate for men’s declining participation. Thus, overall non-employment levels are 
near historic lows in the 1990s.   29 
We then examine the relationship between women’s and men’s measures of labor 
market slackness and real compensation growth and changes in inflation. Measures of 
unemployment for men and women tend to explain a higher percentage of the variation in 
real compensation growth than do measures of non-employment. Thus, non-employment 
may be an important concept for summarizing individual’s activities, but in terms of 
predicting real compensation changes, people’s self-definition of their activities seems to 
matter. This makes sense if it is disproportionately those who are actively searching for 
jobs who put downward pressure on wages.  However, in models of changes in inflation, 
(detrended) non-employment measures, particularly for men, tend to explain as much or 
more of the variation than do measures of unemployment.  This calls into question the 
exact mechanism through which real wage growth translates into changes in price 
inflation, and suggests that those interested in changes in inflation should consider non-
employment in addition to more traditional measures of labor market slackness. 
Although in the full period from 1965 to 2002, men’s measures of labor market 
slackness tend to explain more of the variation in compensation growth and changes in 
inflation than do women’s this result masks a stark change over the period. After 1984, 
women’s measures of labor market slackness, or measures of labor market slackness that 
include women, tend to explain more of the variation in real compensation growth and 
changes in inflation than do measures based on men alone. This suggests that around the 
period when women’s individual labor force participation begins to look much more like 
men’s, women’s measures of labor market slackness begin to behave very much like 
men’s in econometric models of the macro economy.   30 
Overall in the latter period, the U.S. economy appears able to sustain lower levels 
of unemployment and non-employment without upward pressure on wages and prices.  
Whether this is due to structural, demand side changes in the nature of the labor market 
and macro economy, or simply due to compositional shifts in the labor force toward 
higher skilled individuals who tend to have lower rates of unemployment and non-
employment, is an open question. 
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Figure 1a: Percent of Weeks Per Year in Unemployment, Nonparticipation, 
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Note: Authors' calculations based on March Current Population Surveys. See text for details.
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Figure 1b: Percent of Weeks Per Year in Unemployment, Nonparticipation, and 
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Note: Authors' calculations based on March Current Population Surveys. See text for details.
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Figure 2: Percent of Weeks Per Year in Unemployment, Nonparticipation, and 
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Note: Authors' calculations based on March Current Population Surveys. Full time equivalent (FTE) nonemployment adjusts for usual hours 
worked per week. See text for details.
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Figure 3a: Unemployment, Nonemployment and Nonparticipation Rates, 




























































Notes: Data shown are annual averages of monthly aggregate CPS data available from the BLS.
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Figure 3b: Unemployment, Nonemployment and Nonparticipation Rates, 




























































Notes: Data shown are annual averages of monthly aggregate CPS data available from the BLS.
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Figure 4: Unemployment, Nonemployment and Nonparticipation Rates, 
































































Notes: Data shown are annual averages of monthly aggregate CPS data available from the BLS. 
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Figure 8a: Labor Force Participation Rates by Completed Education Levels: 


































































































































































Elementary Some HS HS Graduate Some College College Grad
Notes: Based on authors' caculations from Current Population Survey data.
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Figure 8b: Labor Force Participation Rates by Completed Education Levels: 
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Notes: Based on authors' calculations from Current Population Survey data.
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Figure 9: Labor Force Participation Rates by Completed Education Levels: 
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Note: Based on authors' calculations from Current Population Survey data.   46 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
(Standard Errors) 
        
    Overall  Period 1  Period 2 
      1965-2002 1965-1983 1984-2002 
        
Inflation   4.207  5.774  2.724 
   (0.388)  (0.560)  (0.233) 
Change in Inflation  -0.003  0.150  -0.148 
   (0.224)  (0.437)  (0.146) 
Real Hourly  1.496  1.924  1.091 
Compensation Growth  (0.289)  (0.460)  (0.343) 
Real Average   0.562  0.827  0.311 
Hourly Earnings Growth   (0.280) (0.495) (0.281) 
 
Unemployment Rate     
Overall   5.993  6.164  5.832 
   (0.256)  (0.460)  (0.251) 
Men   5.750  5.637  5.857 
   (0.284)  (0.520)  (0.269) 
Women   6.379  6.984  5.805 
   (0.236)  (0.370)  (0.237) 
Prime Age Unemployment    
Overall   4.619  4.506  4.726 
   (0.230)  (0.413)  (0.229) 
Men   4.312  3.947  4.657 
   (0.263)  (0.464)  (0.251) 
Women   5.108  5.428  4.805 
   (0.199)  (0.333)  (0.210) 
Nonemployment     
Overall   39.827  42.213  37.567 
   (0.435)  (0.242)  (0.316) 
Men   27.488  25.947  28.948 
   (0.420)  (0.679)  (0.179) 
Women   50.928  56.709  45.450 
   (1.051)  (0.806)  (0.545) 
        
Number of Obs.  37  18  19 
Notes: Compensation growth is inflation adjusted using the Personal Consumption 
Expenditure Chain-Type Prince Index.  
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Table 2: Estimated Relationships between Measures of Labor Market Slackness and Measures 










Change in  
Inflation  
Unemployment Rate          
Overall       
Adjusted R-square  0.5170  0.7472  0.3488 
Implied "zero growth" rate  7.714  6.712  6.012 
 (0.337)  (0.330)  (0.457) 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.5634  0.1778  0.8605 
      
Male      
Adjusted R-square  0.5754  0.8147  0.3925 
Implied "zero growth" rate  7.597  6.364  5.770 
 (0.286)  (0.145)  (0.401) 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.9057  0.2381  0.7029 
      
Female      
Adjusted R-square  0.3905  0.7966  0.2455 
Implied "zero growth" rate  8.223  6.886  6.398 
 (0.601)  (0.261)  (0.666) 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.0009  0.0000  0.0109 
P-value for AR(1)  0.4985  0.1219  0.3722 
      
Prime Age Unemployment Rate          
Overall      
Adjusted R-square  0.5772  0.8410  0.4028 
Implied "zero growth" rate  6.117  5.102  4.636 
 (0.240)  (0.090)  (0.320) 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.8224  0.7583  0.7788 
      
Male         
Adjusted R-square  0.5930  0.7732  0.4157 
Implied "zero growth" rate  6.021  4.997  4.332 
 (0.238)  (0.187)  (0.309) 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.8425  0.1677  0.4660 
      
Female          
Adjusted R-square  0.4622  0.8351  0.3187 
Implied "zero growth" rate  6.497  5.534  5.122 
 (0.358)  (0.163)  (0.426) 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.0000  0.0000  0.0006 
P-value for AR(1)  0.3946  0.1370  0.3944   48 
      
Detrended Nonemployment 
Rate          
Overall      
Adjusted R-square  0.3833  0.7109  0.4751 
Implied "zero growth" rate  40.500  39.714  39.829 
 (0.175)  (0.163)  (0.109) 
P-value for joint sig. of Nonemp. 
lags 0.0113  0.0000  0.0000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.756  0.3451  0.5432 
      
Male      
Adjusted R-square  0.4025  0.7373  0.4879 
Implied "zero growth" rate  28.309  27.371  27.489 
 (0.193)  (0.190)  (0.129) 
P-value for joint sig. of Nonemp. 
lags  0.0034 0.0000  0.0000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.8886  0.1994  0.3155 
      
Female      
Adjusted R-square  0.3390  0.6383  0.4220 
Implied "zero growth" rate  51.549  50.798  50.931 
 (0.216)  (0.179)  (0.103) 
P-value for joint sig. of Nonemp. 
lags 0.0465  0.0000  0.0000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.7174  0.7349  0.9599 
           
Number of Observations  37  37  37 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 include one lag of the dependent variable and the contemporaneous 
measure of the relevant labor market slackeness. In addition for column 2 estimates lags of the 
relevant right-hand-side variables are included as follows: 1 lag of overall unemployment, 3 lags 
of men’s and women’s  unemployment, 4 lags of prime age unemployment, 1 lag of men’s prime 
age unemployment, 3 lags of women’s prime age unemployment, and 1 lag of overall, men’s, 
and women’s detrended non-employment. Column 3 estimates include 2 lags of the change in 
inflation and the relevant contemporaneous measure of labor market slackenss. The implied 
"zero growth" rates are calculated as the negative of the constant divided by the sum of the 
coefficients on the relevant measure of labor market slackness. For non-employment we add 
back in the average of the HP filter trend component in order to report the implied rate in levels. 
Standard errors on the implied "zero growth" rates are calculated using the delta method with 
Newey-West standard error estimates for the underlying coefficients, allowing for up to fourth-
order autocorrelation.    49 
  
Table 3: Estimated Relationships between Measures of Labor Market Slackness and  
Measures of Real Compensation Growth by Period 
  
 
Real Hourly Compensation 
Growth 
Real Average Hourly Earnings 
Growth       Change in Inflation 
 1965-1983  1984-2002  1965-1983  1984-2002  1965-1983  1984-2002 
   Period 1  Period 2  Period 1  Period 2  Period 1  Period 2 
Lags of the Dependent Variable  1 1-3  1  1  1-4  0 
            
Unemployment Rate            
Overall             
P-value for UR coefficients equal  0.050  0.001  0.702 
Lags of the unemployment rate  1-2  0  1-4  1-2  0  1 
Adjusted R-squared  0.799  0.514  0.856  0.861  0.571  0.199 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.013  0.004 
P-value for AR(1)  0.576  0.778  0.392  0.336  0.642  0.639 
            
Male            
P-value for UR coefficients equal  0.024  0.007  0.712 
Lags of the unemployment rate  1-2  1  1-4  1-2  0  0 
Adjusted R-squared  0.828  0.194  0.840  0.863  0.593  0.186 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.000  0.014  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.001 
P-value for AR(1)  0.947  0.643  0.683  0.415  0.495  0.691 
            
Female            
P-value for UR coefficients equal  0.120  0.002  0.043 
Lags of the unemployment rate  1-4  0  1-4  1  1-4  1 
Adjusted R-squared  0.732  0.517  0.844  0.842  0.572  0.224 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.013  0.003 
P-value for AR(1)  0.321  0.847  0.216  0.636  0.034  0.525 
                      50 
 
Prime Age Unemployment Rate            
Overall            
P-value for UR coefficients equal  0.040  0.001  0.489 
Lags of the prime-age UR  1-2  1  1-4  1-2  0  0 
Adjusted R-squared  0.826  0.527  0.854  0.861  0.610  0.170 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.002 
P-value for AR(1)  0.957  0.621  0.736  0.299  0.560  0.728 
            
Male               
P-value for UR coefficients equal  0.042  0.005  0.381 
Lags of the prime-age UR  1-2  1  1-4  1-2  0  0 
Adjusted R-squared  0.823  0.536  0.807  0.860  0.623  0.173 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.000  0.012  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.002 
P-value for AR(1)  0.678  0.581  0.885  0.451  0.396  0.700 
            
Female                
P-value for UR coefficients equal  0.154  0.012  0.038 
Lags of the prime-age UR  1-2  0  1-4  1-2  1-4  1 
Adjusted R-squared  0.754  0.523  0.869  0.856  0.606  0.256 
P-value for joint sig. of UR lags  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.002 
P-value for AR(1)  0.630  0.802  0.295  0.145  0.044  0.579 
                    
Detrended Nonemployment Rate            
Overall            
P-value for NR coefficients equal  0.006  0.034  0.023 
Lags of nonemployment  1-2  1  1  1  1-4  0 
Adjusted R-squared  0.583  0.389  0.688  0.816  0.679  0.340 
P-value for joint sig. of Nonemp. 
lags 0.005  0.051  0.000  0.019  0.000  0.000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.377  0.662  0.423  0.359  0.014  0.221 
            
Male              51 
P-value for NR coefficients equal  0.473  0.042  0.596 
Lags of nonemployment  1-2  0  1  1  1-4  0 
Adjusted R-squared  0.590  0.358  0.726  0.809  0.692  0.284 
P-value for joint sig. of Nonemp. 
lags 0.003  0.228  0.000  0.047  0.000  0.000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.313  0.794  0.220  0.413  0.025  0.370 
            
Female            
P-value for NR coefficients equal  0.002  0.035  0.034 
Lags of nonemployment  1-2  1-3  1  1  1-4  0 
Adjusted R-squared  0.546  0.535  0.582  0.819  0.609  0.379 
P-value for joint sig. of Nonemp. 
lags 0.008  0.003  0.000  0.0004  0.013  0.000 
P-value for AR(1)  0.508  0.220  0.824  0.301  0.086  0.139 
                    
Number of Observations  18  19  18  19  18  19 
Notes: Each combination of dependent variable and measure of labor market slackness is estimated separately by time period. All estimates 
include the contemporaneous measure of the relevant right-hand-side variable. Additionally, lags of the dependent variable and the relevant 
labor market slackness measure are also included as reported in the table. Lag structure was chosen using information criteria as described 
in the text. The P-value for the F-test that the labor market slackness variable coefficients are equal across the time periods comes from a 
single regression including a full set of period interactions and the maximum number of lags included in the separate specifications.   52 
Table 4: Estimates of Labor Market Slackness Levels Associated with  





Real Average Hourly 
Earnings Growth 















   Period 1  Period 2  Period 1  Period 2  Period 1  Period 2 
        
Unemployment Rate        
zero  9.251 7.159 6.870 6.150 8.301 5.136 
average labor productivity  10.965  9.040  8.584  8.031     
standard error  (0.653) (0.325) (0.191) (0.197) (1.168) (0.528) 
Prime-Age Unemployment 
Rate        
zero  7.205 6.048 5.198 5.042 6.284 4.225 
average  labor  productivity 8.918 7.929 6.912 6.923     
standard error  (0.483) (0.318) (0.160) (0.175) (0.717) (0.489) 
Nonemployment Rate        
zero  40.796 38.084 42.021 37.328 42.413 37.430 
average  labor  productivity  42.510 39.965 43.734 39.209     
standard error  (1.907) (0.171) (0.228) (0.219) (0.195) (0.059) 
                    
Notes: Calculations are based on the estimates shown in Table 3 for the "overall" measures of labor 
market slackness. Standard errors, in parentheses, are calculated using the delta method. For the 
non-employment rate calculations we add back the average of the HP filter trend component for each 
period in order to show the level of non-employment associated with zero compensation growth and 
no acceleration of inflation. Average growth in labor productivity is equal to 1.71 percent in period 1 
and 1.88 percent in period 2. 
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